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ABSTRACT 
The advent of quantum computers may compromise 
the security of todays conventional cryptosystems. 
Quantum key distribution protocols are proposed to 
ward off such threat; but, for the moment, the 
proposed quantum protocols are an hybrid of 
classical and quantum mechanisms and, as a 
consequence, they will result compromised as easily 
as conventional cryptography by quantum 
cryptanalysis.  
Keywords: Cryptography, Protocols, Security, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Quantum computing is a burgeoning field of 
research that applies concepts of quantum physics to 
building more efficient computers. Although only 
rudimentary quantum computers have been built so 
far, many researchers believe that quantum 
computing has great potential. In recent years, there 
has been extensive studies about the possibilities 
offered by quantum computation to cryptology. 
From the point of view of quantum computing 
researchers, after the advent of high power quantum 
computers, conventional cryptography may be no 
longer secure. Cryptanalysis tasks would be 
dramatically accelerated with the help of quantum 
computers, if such computers are ever build. The 
state of a quantum computer is a superposition of 
exponentially many basis states, each of which 
corresponds to a state of a classical computer of the 
same size. By taking advantage of interference and 
entanglement in the system, a quantum computer 
could readily perform tasks that would take much 
longer on classical computers. 
A few general observations can be made to 
demonstrate it: 
• Public key cryptosystems, based on the 
difficulty of factoring large integers and finding 
discrete logarithms, can be broken in a period of 
time growing exponentially with the key digit 
number using todays computers. However, with 
the quantum factoring algorithm proposed by 
Shor, running in a quantum computer, such 
problems could be solved in a period of time 
growing only quadratically with the key digit 
number ([SHO97]).  
• Quantum mechanics can alleviate brute force 
attacks on secret key cryptosystems too. 
Grovers efficient algorithm can reduce the time 
needed for searching applications over unsorted 
data from O(N) to O( )N , being N the key 
digit number ([GRO97]). This means that the 
key length of secret key algorithms should be 
doubled to withstand this attack. 
• The hash function security will be likewise 
compromised as shown by Brasard, Høyer and 
Tapp in [BRA97]. They have developed a 
quantum algorithm to solve the collision 
problem in arbitrary r−to−one functions, 
reducing the computation time from O( )N  to 
O( )3 /N r . 
Hence, it is proposed to switch from conventional 
cryptographic algorithms to quantum cryptography, 
whose security, as stated by these researchers, is 
based on fundamental principles of quantum 
mechanics, rather than in unproven computation 
assumptions ([GOT00]). 
Vernams one time pad cryptosystem is the only 
cryptosystem to remain secure under these and any 
other foreseeable attacks, because it is the only 
system up to date with provable security.  
2. QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Quantum cryptography is a modern version of the 
one time pad system. Although thoroughly 
unbreakable, the one time pad still needs that the 
secret key be transmitted between the 
communicating parties. The Achilles heel of the 
traditional one time pad system lies in this need of a 
trusted courier for the key distribution. Quantum 
cryptography comes to the rescue, substituting the 
trusted courier by photon transmission. 
The core of quantum cryptography is the fact that 
given a single photon in one of four possible 
polarization angles: vertical, horizontal, +45º and 
45º, it is impossible to distinguish with certainty 
which polarization angle it has really. 
The quantum no-cloning theorem establish that an 
unknown quantum state cannot be copied, because 
the photon state under observation would be 
disturbed with a polarization measurement. 
Consequently, the result of a measurement has a 
50% of uncertainty and any copy would be 
unfaithful. 
Precise measurement can be made if photons are 
transmitted with only two orthogonal angles. 
Suppose that photons are transmitted rectilinearly 
(horizontally or vertically) polarized. A birefringent 
calcite crystal oriented in one of the two angles will 
accurately separate photons in two different paths, 
according to their polarization. But, if diagonally 
polarized photons (+45º or 45º) are received as 
well, the same calcite crystal will classify them 
either as vertical or horizontal at random with equal 
probability.  
3. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION 
PROTOCOLS 
Bennett and Brassard proposed the first quantum 
cryptosystem in the early 1984, named BB84 
([BEN84]). Actually, it was a quantum key 
distribution (QKD) protocol, allowing two separated 
users to generate a random key, and then share 
securely. A simpler QKD scheme, the B92 was 
proposed in 1992 by Bennett, using only two 
different non-orthogonal states, instead of four 
([BEN92]). Both protocols were photon polarization 
based schemes. The difficulty of these systems is to 
keep stable polarizations over long distances. 
Another interesting scheme, that overcomes this 
difficulty, is known as Plug an Play QKD and was 
proposed by Muller et all ([MUL97]). It was based 
on phase encoding of photons and detection with 
Faraday mirrors, avoiding the need of controlling 
polarization variation effects. This scheme was 
successfully implemented over a 23 km long regular 
telecom optical fiber, with present date technology 
at bit rates of 1 Kb/s. 
A ground-based free-space demonstration 
experiment in daylight over a distance of 500 m 
through air has been reported recently in Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, US ([HUG99]), 
showing the feasibility of secure quantum 
communication in ground-satellite links. 
Given present date technology, bit rates of 100 
bits/s can be achieved over distances between 45 km 
and 70 km. It is supposed that in the near future 
the maximum distances will be limited to 100 km, 
for the same bit rate ([ZBI98]).  
4. THE B92 PROTOCOL 
In order to appreciate how quantum cryptography 
works, it is instructive to examine Charles Bennetts 
B92 quantum key distribution protocol. 
Suppose that Alice and Bob will employ a quantum 
channel and a classical public channel to 
communicate with each other. Single photons are 
being used to carry the information across the 
quantum channel, which could be either an optical 
fiber or free space. The public channel could be any 
conventional one, like a telephone line or computer 
network, for example. 
Table 1 illustrates how such protocol works.
 
Alice raw key 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Alice polarization " | " " | | | " 
Bob raw key 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Bob polarization #    # #  # 
Photon passes Bob analyzer?  no  no  no  yes  no yes  no  no 
Distilled and shared key    1  0   
Table 1 
In general, this protocol consists of a bit by bit 
comparison of linearly polarized single photons that 
Alice transmits to Bob. First, Alice generates a raw 
truly random bit stream, which records and 
transmits to Bob. She transmits single photons, in 
one of the two following polarization directions: 
vertical (to symbolize 0) and +45º( to represent 
1). 
Bob also has two polarizers (analyzers), one oriented 
in the horizontal direction (to symbolize 1) and 
the other at 45º (corresponding to 0). He selects 
one polarizer at random each time that Alice sends 
a single photon, and records whether the photon 
passes or not (Y or N) through his chosen polarizer 
and which was the polarizer he used.  
Every time Bob uses the analyzer that do not agree 
to the polarization states sent by Alice, each result 
(Y or N) can occur with a probability p1 = 50%. For 
instance, if Alice sends a vertically polarized photon 
and Bob selects his +45 polarizer, there is a 
probability p2 = 50% that this photon pass through 
his analyzers. However, if he had chosen his 
horizontal polarizer, he would not have detected the 
photon. It is clear, thus, that when Bob does detect 
a photon, he knows certainly that both have the 
same bit value.  
After the transmission of all the photons, Bob sends 
a copy of his successes and failures (Y or N) to Alice 
over the public channel, not revealing the polarizers 
he employed to measure each bit. 
Finally, Alice and Bob keep only the distilled 
sequence of bits for which Bobs result was Y and 
these bits become the shared secret key. The 
average of successful bits is 25%, therefore 75% of 
original sequence would be lost, being this 
inefficiency the price to pay on behalf of secrecy.  
In a real life system, optical imperfections and 
detector noise will introduce additional errors, as 
high as 1.6%, that should be necessarily corrected.  
To guarantee an error free quantum key, Alice and 
Bob carry out an information reconciliation 
procedure, using standard error correcting codes 
over the public channel ([CAC97]). During this 
procedure some bits are revealed to an occasional 
eavesdropper listening at the public channel, so they 
must also be discarded, lowering the amount of 
usable distilled key bit number. 
Thanks to the no cloning theorem, a passive 
eavesdropper (Eve) listening and retransmitting at 
the quantum channel, will result in 25% of errors, 
that will be found by Alice and Bob when 
performing the information reconciliation, revealing 
Eve's manipulations. In such case, Alice and Bob 
will drop the whole sequence.  
4.1 PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
There are a few practical issues that affect 
dramatically the QKD performance and security. 
The generation, propagation and detection of single 
photons are far from being a solved problem. 
It is extraordinarily difficult to generate a single 
photon state because of the Poisson statistics of real 
light sources. Instead of generating photons, very 
tiny laser pulses are used. The experimental set-up 
consists of two solid estate pulsed lasers and two 
electro-optic polarizers, pulses are dimmed and then 
combined with a passive coupler. The problem is 
that a pulse may contain several photons, allowing 
Eve to divert some of them with a beamsplitter, 
therefore gaining knowledge of the photon 
polarization without being detected. To avoid this 
threat, laser pulses are attenuated to a level  such 
that less than 1% of pulses contain more than one 
photon. The price to be paid is that the probability 
that the pulse contains one photon is about 10%. 
This means that about 90% of pulses contain no 
photons, thus reducing the data rate drastically.   
The difficulty with polarization based systems is the 
need to keep stable polarizations over long distances. 
Due to the birefringence of optical fibers and the 
environment effects, the output polarization 
fluctuates erratically. Polarization variation effects 
are compensated by means of Pockels-cells or liquid 
crystals. To compensate the short term polarization 
changes the laser is switched each millisecond from 
quantum operation to continuous wave operation, 
thus originating an additional reduction of effective 
data rate. 
Another propagation problem is that optical fibers 
are not perfectly circular, causing polarization 
dependent loses. Similar effects are present in other 
passive optical devices.   
Measuring photon polarization is also a delicate 
problem. Lack of precision in the positioning of  
polarization analyzers may cause different measured 
value of p1 and p2 probabilities. 
5. ATTACKS ON QKD PROTOCOL 
It is a well proven fact that QKD protocols are 
unconditionally secure against passive eavesdropping 
attacks, ([BIH97] and [MAY98]), still taking into 
account that Eve can read about 1% of bits.  
But no QKD ordinary protocol can stand the classic 
man in the middle attack. It is an active attack in 
which a malicious active attacker (Mallory) 
impersonates Bob while communicating with Alice 
and impersonates Alice while communicating with 
Bob, because he is sitting in between, both in the 
quantum channel and in the public channel, 
carrying out two separated communication sessions 
with Alice and Bob. This threat can be overcome by 
authentication of the public channel messages.  
The preferred public channel message authentication 
procedure chosen by quantum computing researchers 
is based on the old secret key signatures proposed 
by Wegner and Carter ([WEG81]), rather than in 
public key signatures. This technique requires that 
Alice and Bob share a small initial secret key to 
begin with. The final sequence distillation and the 
information reconciliation procedure will consume 
some bits of the initial secret key step by step, thus 
exhausting the initial key material after a few 
operations. To overcome this depletion, the secret 
key can be replenished from the new fresh key 
material generated by the QKD ([HUG95]).  
6. SECURITY OF QKD PROTOCOLS 
There are some claims of proof of  unconditional 
security of QKD against passive wiretaps carried out 
by Eve. One of the most widely accepted was given 
by Lo and Chau [LOC99]. However, although QKD 
is always performed in two stages, over a quantum 
channel first and over a public channel next, all 
proofs focus on the quantum channel only. But it 
will be naive to think that this kind of attacks are 
the only threat against a quantum cryptographic 
system. Eve or Mallory could try to attack the 
public channel instead of the quantum channel. 
The security of a system is as weak as the security 
of its weakest part. For QKD to work, a short initial 
key material must be interchanged between Alice 
and Bob. And this initial key intended for mutual 
authentication must be shared using a classical 
protocol, before entering any quantum negotiation. 
According to the previous section, the whole 
security of quantum cryptography relies on the 
authentication procedure of the conventional 
channel. As described in [WEG81], the 
authentication mechanism is a hash function of the 
message and a portion of the short initial key shared 
by both partners. Thus, if the hypothetic quantum 
computer announced by the quantum computing 
researchers will be ever built, the security of this 
kind of signature will also be cast in doubt. 
Researchers in quantum computing state that the 
advent of quantum computers will lead to a 
retroactive total security break with catastrophic 
consequences. But they remark that Ironically, 
quantum mechanics also comes to the rescue, 
thanks to quantum cryptography ([HOI98]). This 
assertion is a sophism, because, at least, the security 
of quantum cryptography is reduced to the security 
of a conventional cryptosystem, supposedly insecure 
under a quantum attack.  
If for some lucky reason the Wegner algorithm 
resulted secure against a quantum attack, what is 
the quantum cryptography utility?, to which extent 
does it help to the communications security? In that 
case it will suffice to use conventional cryptography 
based in the Wegner algorithm, thus avoiding the 
messy, slow and inefficient quantum protocols. 
Next, we must point out the problem inherent to 
the way of replenishing the exhausted short initial 
key, with new fresh key material generated by the 
QKD. The use of an old key to negotiate a new one, 
that will substitute the former, is a cryptographic 
bad practice that should be by all means avoided. 
It is self evident that if the short initial key, or any 
intermediate key, is compromised, then all the 
future transactions will be compromised as well, 
leading to a permanent security break.  
Theoretical demonstration of unconditional security 
against passive eavesdropping attacks of QKD 
protocols assumes that the final distilled quantum 
key sequence is perfectly random. But it should be 
remarked that randomness of practical 
implementations rely on the mechanical accuracy of 
optical devices and mechanical absolute perfection is 
an impossible goal. 
Low (and perhaps asymmetrical) detection 
probability of different polarization states of laser 
pulses, unequal pulse amplitudes of different lasers, 
inaccuracies in the polarization variation effects 
compensation, polarization dependent loses and 
uneven polarization analyzers positioning, all 
together, may lead to an imbalanced distribution of 
ones and zeros of the finally distilled quantum key, 
thus not satisfying the inexcusable Golomb 
randomness postulates ([GOL67]). Certainly, Eve 
will exploit this fact to mount an attack against the 
key. Unfortunately, quantum cryptography 
researchers do not seem to be aware of this threat 
and no suitable measures are proposed to ward it 
off, if there exist any.  
Raw bit sequences produced by real life quantum 
number generators are not balanced, bit 
distributions of about 40/60 of ones and zeros are 
typical ([STE99]). But cryptographically secure 
unbiased sequences can be build, starting from the 
raw imbalanced ones, by appropriate mathematical 
procedures ([PER92]). 
Obviously, QKD information reconciliation 
procedures may include a method to test and fix any 
bias of the raw quantum key. But it is unclear, until 
now, that such task could be performed using a 
public channel without revealing any information to 
Eve.   
Finally, unless a remarkable breakthrough in 
quantum communications speed takes place, QKD 
will never be able to generate enough key material 
as to encrypt big volumes of information, such as 
real time audio or, worst, video. Even though 
considerably large improvements in speed are 
accomplished, in the mid term, QKD will only be 
useful for classical key distribution, thus depending 
again on classical cryptography for the encryption of 
bulk information. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Quantum cryptography must be regarded as a very 
interesting field of applied physics research, but not 
as a solid spare candidate for the present day 
cryptographic techniques. This observation will hold 
true as long as its security is just sustained on the 
security of the conventional cryptographic 
algorithms that it is intended to substitute. 
Todays quantum cryptography is an hybrid of 
classical and quantum mechanisms and much work 
must be done yet to achieve secure full quantum 
cryptographic protocols, not just QKD protocols. 
More attention should be paid to practical 
implementation aspects, heavily dependent on the 
optical devices mechanical precision, that can affect 
adversely the quantum key statistics and 
consequently its security.  
Therefore, it would be better to pay attention to 
well established fundamental principles of 
cryptography, rather than entrusting unproven 
quantum mechanics statistical assumptions. 
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